In the city of Tuapse, on Morskaya Street, among the houses on a steep mountain slope, there is an old sea minesweeper of the I-5 type.
It is interesting that it is only 340 meters from the sea in a straight line, but the height of the monument above the level of this very sea is 36 meters.
Free parking is available nearby.
Access is free, you can touch and climb. There is no security.
The condition of the monument is tired.
Filming date: September 14, 2017.

01.

All photos are clickable up to 3648x2736.

02. Mine minesweeper MT-102.
Launched in 1944
Participated in mine sweeping in the ports of Bulgaria, Romania, Novorossiysk and Tuapse.
Groups 059 and 102 took part in the restoration and reconstruction.


03. By groups, apparently, we mean student groups of the nearby Tuapse Hydrometeorological College.
The year of reconstruction is not indicated.


04. The original tactical or serial number of the ship is unknown and has been replaced (probably) by the number of the reenactor training group.
The resulting designation was MT-102 (Mine Minesweeper 102).
There were no minesweepers of the I-5 type with this number.
They all had the following letter indices (to which numbers were added): KEMTSCH, RTSH, Ya, MK and KT.
Sometimes the boats were renamed and renumbered, but a boat with the name MT-102 never existed among the Y-5 type.


05. Boats with a steel hull of the Yaroslavets type (Ya-5) were built in 1942 - 1945 at plant No. 345 (PO Box No. 88, now the Yaroslavl Shipyard).
Total displacement: 23.4 tons, length: 18.71 m, maximum speed: 10 knots.

Initially they came in two versions - mortar boats and minesweepers.
The mortar boats carried DShK machine guns on the wheelhouse and stern, and on the bow an M-8 launcher with twenty-four guides for 82-mm M-8 rockets.
35 Ya-5 mortar boats were launched.

In the Minesweeper version, the DShK machine gun was placed on the bow, and a mount for a contact trawl was placed on the stern.
There were 33 minesweepers made.
Later, some mortar boats were converted into minesweepers and vice versa.

Several boats of the Ya-5 type have survived to this day.
In addition to this, located in Tuapse, there are such boats in Taganrog (KEMTSCH-772, embankment) and Kyiv (MK-4, yacht club near Vodnikov Island, very sad state).

Another one should be in Novorossiysk, but, except for one old muddy photo, multiplied by a million reposters, there are no other mentions of it.
The number is as unknown as the real number of MT-102.
Has anyone seen such a boat in Novorossiysk or knows where it went?
Or maybe it was he who was dragged to Tuapse and he is already in front of us? :)


06. The standard engine of most Y-5 type boats was a four-stroke in-line diesel M-17 with a power of 75 hp.
Some options received other engines - Chrysler gasoline (93 hp) or diesel engine with 170 hp.

To start the diesel engine, a special 20-horsepower gasoline “starter” V-20 was used, and on some boats a battery electric starter was used.


07. Engine room deckhouse on the right side.


08. Wheelhouse and imitation of a DShK machine gun.


09. Bow end of the boat, bow bales, bollard (one horn is broken), flagpole and anchor hawse.


10. Anchor-mooring horizontal capstan (windlass).
With its help, they raised and lowered anchors, and also moored to the shore.


11. The only detail preserved device on the ship.


12. Hall’s anchor standing “on the ground” symbolizes the eternal anchorage of a warship.


13. Fender beam at main deck level.


14. Bale strip - a device for guiding the mooring rope so that when mooring it does not cling to the side railings (rails) and does not rub against the edge of the side.

The most dangerous sea. Mine Warfare during World War II Lott Arnold

Chapter 15 SEVERAL MINESWEEPERS

SEVERAL MINESWEEPERS

Beyond the Sea of ​​Japan lies the Land of Dawn. And along the Sea of ​​Japan on July 15, 1950, small ships again went to war. Directly ahead of the seven small minesweepers, the Korean mountain ranges met the sea at a place called Pohang-Dong. Just 25 miles north in Yeongdeok, the Communist army pushed back South Korean and American troops. In three days, 36 American ships will arrive here, delivering the 1st Cavalry Division, which is in full combat readiness. The undeclared war had been going on for 20 days, and a difficult battle lay ahead in Pohang.

It was not known who would win at Pohang, but the minesweepers arrived here first. Whatever awaited them in the bay - mines or shelling from the shore - they had to get the job done. The 1st Cavalry Division was required to land ashore at Pohang exactly on time - July 18th. The minesweepers had three days to clear the bay, and no one was interested in whether this was enough or not.

There were no mines on the approaches to Pohang. The minesweepers checked the bay and left before the main forces arrived. The enemy troops advanced rather slowly for the last 25 miles as the naval bombardment began. The 1st Division went ashore as planned without encountering resistance. The battle began later - on the approaches to Busan. Later, minesweepers laid canals leading to Busan or (in August the situation looked like this) from Busan. There were no mines there either.

Judging by newspaper publications, the Korean War began on June 25, 1950 at 4:00 a.m., when a 100,000-strong North Korean army advanced across the 38th parallel to the south, and another 10,000 soldiers landed from the sea in the area of ​​Kangnung and Samcheok. The real reason for the outbreak of hostilities appeared back in August 1945, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff and US President Truman approved an ill-conceived order and, instead of imposing a joint US-Soviet occupation of the entire territory of Korea, divided the country, establishing a border along the 38th parallel. Soviet troops occupied the north, and American troops occupied the south of the country.

For the next five years, the communists in the north crippled the minds of Koreans, raising them in their own image. The Americans in the south were not idle either. First of all, in accordance with the requirements to reduce the military budget, they reduced the number of occupation troops from 50 thousand to 500 people. The American military machine gradually “reduced speed” in order to gradually reach pre-war levels, and post-war American operations in overseas territories were not considered in this regard.

Over the years, it has been generally accepted that the American nuclear threat is a guarantee of world peace, and the presence of heavy intercontinental bombers is a panacea for the outbreak of armed conflicts. Over the next three years, naval forces were sharply reduced, although 7/10 of the planet's territory was still covered by oceans. Post-war changes in the organization of the armed forces and public opinion produced results, many of them quite unexpected. Perhaps one of the most astonishing was the fact that the American invasion force heading to the Korean port of Wonsan (7,000 miles from its strategic nuclear weapons) in 1950 was held in place for eight days by a Communist minefield. The United States of America, considered the greatest maritime power in 1945, lost control of the waters five years later. They were short of several minesweepers.

At the end of World War II, the Pacific mine fleet alone consisted of 500 ships, on which about 3,000 officers and more than 30,000 sailors served. When the Korean War began, the entire US Navy had only two divisions of minesweeper destroyers and 21 smaller minesweepers. A very appropriate question follows: what happened? Why did 99 percent of the most experienced officers and sailors of the mine fleet, due to demobilization, budget cuts and lack of understanding in the fleet of the essence of mine warfare in the period from 1945 to 1950, find other occupations for themselves, and their ships were mothballed and sold for re-equipment? or for scrap?

How did it happen that the Americans immediately forgot that mines are full-fledged and very effective weapons? But from 1945 to 1950, everyone on whom it depended stubbornly continued to believe that mine warfare did not require special qualifications; if necessary, these issues can be resolved by an officer of any specialty. Several young mine experts persisted in their research, but at the command level (most World War II mine commanders had already left active service) mine warfare was not considered an independent branch requiring special training, practical experience and individual research. The few surviving ships of the mine fleet were increasingly used for other purposes.

Why did Americans so quickly forget the mine warfare lessons they learned during World War II? Perhaps they should have learned from the Soviet army, which clearly remembered the lessons of the long-standing Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Military operations in Korea were ground-based, with all Communist supply lines running over land, while the Americans were forced to deliver supplies for their troops by sea. The communists did not need special ships to install sea mines; numerous junks and sampans coped with this task perfectly. The current situation provided the Soviet military with an ideal opportunity to find out what the American Navy knew about mine warfare. Without endangering any of their ships, the Communists easily sank 5 American and 2 Korean ships and damaged several more. The Pentagon literally shuddered when the Chief of Naval Operations received a message from Admiral Smith that began with the words: “The US Navy has lost control of the sea...”

The fleet in Korea was ready to repel attacks from communist submarines and aircraft, sink enemy ships, carry out precision bombing, shelling and a complete blockade of coastal areas. He was ready to perform any task, except for sweeping several dozen contact and magnetic mines. The US Navy in Korea had it all. The only thing missing was a few minesweepers.

Two months after securing the American landing in Pohang, the minesweepers were sent to the western coast of Korea - to Inchon, to the landing site of General MacArthur's forces. After 3 August, the 3rd Mine Squadron was commanded by Captain Spofford, who very quickly realized that minesweepers and minesweeping equipment were sorely lacking. He immediately reported to General Joy that the available forces were not enough to keep three ports open for the fleet, and asked to strengthen the squadron. His request was forwarded to Forrest Sherman, who was in charge of naval operations in the Far East. The admiral replied that it was not possible to reactivate additional minesweepers, since there were higher priority tasks.

Help was still provided, although not too significant. Admiral Dinbrink ordered the reactivation of three AM ships at Yokosuka and two at Guam. Three more were sent from Pearl Harbor. But none of them arrived in time to provide the necessary assistance to Spofford at Inchon.

Landing at Inchon seemed to be a very difficult task. The big problem was the tide, which reached a maximum height of 33 feet. To approach the shore, landing ships needed high water, which, according to the lunar calendar, should have arrived on September 15, October 11 or November 3 (plus or minus one day). Before approaching Incheon, it was necessary to pass the Flying Fish Channel - a very dangerous narrow passage 60 miles long in terms of navigation, in which currents operate at speeds of up to 5 knots. If the ship in front is disabled by a mine or shore fire, the others will be trapped. At low tide they will end up on the ground with all the ensuing consequences.

Fortunately, mines were not a serious problem in Incheon. On the morning of September 10, Korean captain Commander Lee Hang So, sailing north from Inchon on the Korean ship RS-703, noticed a small boat from which mines were being laid. One shot was enough to send her flying into the air. At least you didn't have to worry about those mines anymore. However, there were mines in Korean waters, and this fact could not be discounted. The destroyer Makin saw mines a little further north, in the Chhinnampo area, and three days later, gunners from the ships Jamaica and Charity sank several floating mines in the area. On September 13, the shelling of Volmi-Do began, preceding the landing of troops. The first ships to enter the Flying Fish Channel, the destroyers USS Mansfield and USS DeHaven, spotted mines. The water was low, so the mines were very clearly visible. The enthusiastic gunners shot down almost the entire field, leaving the minesweepers almost without work.

On September 15, the minesweepers began trawling the inner roadstead of Incheon, found no mines, and left by evening. On the same day, the landing of troops began, and the battleship Missouri began shelling enemy positions on the coast.

25 miles from Incheon is the capital of Korea - Seoul. 10 days after the landing, General MacArthur's infantrymen drove the North Korean army out of Seoul.

Pohang, Busan, Incheon. Next was Wonsan. The minesweepers returned to the eastern coast of Korea, where the South Korean army pursued the enemy day and night. The question of how best to bring American troops into the major Korean port of Wonsan soon developed into a major debate involving the Army and Navy. The Army was inclined to send the 10th Corps to Wonsan by sea (830 miles around the peninsula), arguing that movement over land was undesirable due to its peculiar terrain and would lead to the loss of heavy equipment.

The naval commanders believed that the infantrymen would completely cover the route from Inchon to Wonsan by land. The troops and equipment were already on the shore; removing them by sea would have significantly complicated the delivery of cargo for the 8th Army. Admiral Joy believed that traveling by land would take much less time and require less labor. He was right: the fleet lacked cargo and landing ships, but above all, there was a catastrophic shortage of minesweepers. However, the army preferred transportation by sea.

Therefore, Admiral Struble, who was in Inchon on board the flagship Rochester, ordered all available personnel 7th Fleet minesweepers proceed to Wonsan. Having the experience of the Second World War behind him, the admiral was aware that he did not have a sufficient number of minesweepers to ensure that all the necessary work was completed. Communist mines, first noticed on September 4, have gone from being a vague threat to a real danger. Two American destroyers were damaged, then two Korean ones, then one American destroyer sank - all this happened within one week! The mines forced us to reckon with ourselves!

The first was the destroyer Brush. Together with Maddox, he fired at enemy coastal batteries in the area of ​​​​the Korean city of Tancheon. On September 26, the team was about to start lunch when an explosion occurred, destroying the premises in the bow of the ship. 13 people died on the spot, 34 were injured. The captain of the Brush was faced with a difficult problem: how to bring the damaged ship to the nearest friendly port, which was Sasebo, located 470 miles from the scene of events. Four days later, Brush entered Sasebo dock. By this time, three more ships had been blown up in communist minefields.

The second was the Korean "YMS-509". On September 28, the minesweeper ran into a mine, which spun its stem, but the engines worked, the crew was also not injured and managed to return the damaged ship to their base in Chinhae.

The third was the destroyer Mansfield. On September 29, Commander Headland took his ship to the Korean port of Chongjin, south of Wonsan, to search for the pilot of the downed plane. The crew of the Mansfield had the opportunity to contemplate the hole in the hull of the Brush, which was trying to reach Sasebo, and were far from underestimating the dangers of mine warfare. Crews of minesweepers encountered mines every day, but destroyer sailors had no such habit, so one should hardly be surprised at the gloomy mood that reigned on the ship. One of the more pessimistic sailors even offered a bet: two to one that they would be unlucky. Almost immediately a mine appeared straight ahead, and they were really out of luck. The explosion injured 28 people, but, fortunately, no one died. After this, the Mansfield followed the Brush for repairs.

The minesweeper Soroka was fourth. He and the Mergenzer had just arrived from Guam. Soroka has been amazingly lucky so far. The Korean War was already the second for this minesweeper. And before World War II, it was a peaceful fishing vessel and was called the “City of San Pedro.” The Soroka successfully survived four war years and five years of post-war operations - a record for a small wooden boat. However, on October 1, when she and the Mergenzer were trawling a canal in Chhuksan - 30 miles north of Pohang - her luck changed. The old vessel was completely destroyed by a mine explosion. 21 people, including the captain, were killed. 12 survivors were picked up on the Mergenzer, all of them were wounded.

Then it was the turn of the Korean “YMS-504”. On the same day, while approaching the port of Mokpo, located in the southwest of the peninsula, its starboard propeller touched a mine. The explosion caused the detonation of two more mines. The ship was seriously damaged and 5 crew members were killed. The enraged commander sent a radio message that the ship needed minor repairs, after which it would be “ready to kill the Reds again.”

Kill the Reds... This process involved large ships firing from the sea if they could get close enough to the shore. The minesweepers were supposed to open the way for them. The Marines at Inchon, the army units that General Almond planned to land at Wonsan on October 20, all had one goal in Korea: to kill the Reds. However, no matter how many soldiers were on the ships, they remained out of work if they were not landed on shore. And despite the precise, well-thought-out plans of senior American commanders, 50 thousand people loaded onto 250 ships spent a whole week on them, killing no one and nothing but time. They could not go ashore in the city, which had already been liberated by South Korean troops. There was only one reason for this: the American Navy lacked several minesweepers.

The minesweepers on site did everything they could. They knew that helicopter pilots from the cruiser Worcester had spotted mines near Wonsan a week earlier. No one had any idea about the number and type of mines in the area. Even if Spofford had known that he had 400 square miles of water in front of him, where about 3,000 mines had been laid, he would have been calmer. At least the task would be clear. By the way, 12 minesweepers were required to solve it. Spofford only had six.

On the first day, the minesweepers cleared a channel 3,000 yards wide and 12 miles long at a depth of 100 to 30 fathoms. At the same time, they raised 21 mines. At first everything went fine, but the “iron bird” from Worcester brought only bad news: there were still many, many, many mines around. The pilot reported that inside the 30-fathom isobath there were 5 more rows of mines blocking the path to the shore for landing ships.

The next day the minesweepers returned to work. The next day, the RVM arrived for aerial observation, and the destroyer Dyachenko delivered a team of submarine bombers who were to search for mines on a shallow-draft raft. "Pirate", "Pledge" and "Incredible" were trawling another channel, which was supposed to be used by Soviet sailors. The “frog people” from the “Dyachenko” discovered and marked 50 mines that day, with the closest ones being 100 yards from the anchored ships. Around midnight, Captain Spofford held a meeting with the minesweeper commanders. It was decided that it would take at least eight days to complete the trawling.

So, on October 12, the minesweepers began work. Almost immediately, "Pirate" cut off six mines, followed by "Pledge" - three mines, "Incredible" - four more. The helicopter reported that there were still many mines ahead, which from above looked very much like a cabbage patch. The minesweepers had to move forward. Trying to get around a mine by turning into an untested area is a fatal mistake in trawling. The sonars did not stop beeping, indicating the presence of mines from all sides. On the Pirate, the lookout reported a mine directly ahead. She was close, too close... Lieutenant McMullen sharply shifted the steering wheel to the left, then jerked it to the right... It was too late. A giant fountain of water and debris shot into the air. The “Pirate” fell to the starboard side, then to the left, after which it quickly sank, taking six crew members with it to the bottom. The sailors who survived the explosion found themselves in cold water. More than 40 people were injured.

A boat was lowered from the Pledge to pick up people. There was no shortage of people willing to come to the aid of the victims. At this time, from the shore - from the side of Sin-Do and Rei-To - they opened fire on the sinking "Pirate". The only 3-incher on the Pledge entered the firefight. As a result, at least one enemy firing point on Sin-Do ceased to exist, but then the Pledge ran out of shells. Therefore, Lieutenant Young decided to continue working - and on time. We swam around the ship for 13 minutes! How many more were there under water?

The lifeboat from the Pledge was still picking up sailors from the Pirate when the Pledge also hit a mine, and the number of people in the water increased considerably. When Lieutenant Young regained consciousness after the explosion, there were only wounded and dead on the bridge. The ship was sinking in dead silence. The wounded tried to provide all possible assistance to each other - they had no time to scream and call for help. The destroyer Endicott rushed to the rescue. On the Pledge, 6 crew members were killed and 50 people were injured. And while rescuers were lifting people from the water, the engines on the Incredible suddenly stopped. Well, no one is immune from breakdowns. But in the end it turned out that many hundreds of Wonsan mines were left to the share of four wooden vessels, former fishing boats. Perhaps they were sailed by courageous and strong-willed people, but they had too few opportunities.

Two days later the canal was practically cleared. They searched for mines from the air and from the water - even Korean fishermen took part in the dangerous event, wanting to earn a few American cigarettes from this. On October 18, the minesweepers passed the last meters. In about an hour the work would be completed, and Wonsan would be open to the fleet, which was expected to arrive the next day. But an hour later people did not have the opportunity to breathe a sigh of relief. On the contrary: it seemed that things were worse than ten days ago. It turned out that Wonsan harbor was literally full of mines, and no one knew what type they were.

Everything happened very quickly. A mine exploded four hundred yards from the stern of the Dive, followed by a second explosion, a third... The last one destroyed the Korean YMS-516 along with half the crew. These certainly could not have been moored contact mines, since their minesweeping had been completed. Apparently, these were influence mines, but what exactly? Without answering this question, it was impossible to start trawling.

The next morning, troop transports arrived, but none were able to enter the port, and the city was already occupied by South Korean soldiers. Later, Admiral Sherman noted: “... if you cannot go where you need to go, and when you need it, then you have lost command of the sea.” Within a week, 250 ships remained in the Wonsan roadstead, and 50 thousand soldiers were bored, hungry (due to the delay, food supplies ran low) and sick (on the Marine Phoenix, 400 people came down with dysentery).

Commander DeForest, a recognized expert in mine warfare, arrived from the United States to help the mine fleet officers in Korea. This man was completely tireless and extremely inquisitive, never missing an opportunity to learn something new. On October 16, he went to Wonsan, hoping to find someone who had at least some information about the mines used by the Communists. DeForest was lucky. He actually managed to make acquaintance with a Korean who knew where the mines were collected. He said that until October 4, there were 30 Soviet specialists in Korea who supervised the process of assembling and installing 3,000 mines in the Wonsan area. Basically, according to the Korean, the mines were contact mines, but there were also many magnetic mines. The information received was certainly valuable, but this was not enough for DeForest, and he continued the conversation with the Korean. In the end, with a joint effort, they depicted the main stages of the assembly process with a twig on the ground, after which the Korean led the American to an impressive pile of garbage and, after digging around, extracted from there exactly what DeForest needed - the coil, which is the heart of the magnetic mine. Having acquired the information, the expert hurried back.

Everything else was a matter of technique. Seven days of continuous trawling followed, but now the officers and sailors of the minesweepers knew exactly what they were looking for, and the Koreans showed where to look. On the evening of October 25, the passage to Wonsan was completely cleared of mines. 15 days were spent trawling. However, only 225 of the estimated 3,000 mines were discovered. The remaining mines, the type and location of which were no longer a secret, would not be dangerous if the ships followed cleared channels and did not enter minefields.

Some time later, the Chief of Naval Operations, interviewed about the mine situation in Wonsan, said: “They caught us with our pants down. Those damn mines cost us an eight-day delay. Because of them, we were unable to land troops ashore for eight days and lost more than 200 people. Under some circumstances, you can lose a war in eight days. We have always thought a lot about submarines, aviation, and since last week we started thinking seriously about mines.”

It takes a year to build a modern minesweeper, and about a month to train the crew. So not much could change in a week.

Soviet specialists in uniform prepared in advance for a mine war. Some of the mines cleared at Wonsan were collected before the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. The bulk of the mines were delivered to Korea before mid-July. In total, more than 4,000 mines passed through the hands of Wonsan railway workers. Soviet military experts trained miners from July 16 to August 17, supervised the assembly of mines in Wonsan and Chinnampo, as well as the installation of magnetic mine fields in Wonsan, and 30 of them were in Wonsan until October 4.

The mines were installed by North Korean fishermen on their junks and sampans, who very quickly learned to do what the Soviet specialists decided. Within three weeks, approximately 3,000 Soviet mines were planted in Wonsan. The lesson learned by the US Navy was remembered for a long time.

Mine sweepers were still working in Wonsan, and the army was already insistently demanding their arrival in Chhinnampo: it was urgently necessary to open this port, located on the west coast, to shipping. Moving from Seoul towards Pyongyang, the 8th Army managed to use up its available reserves. There was a clear shortage of fuel, people were reduced to two meals a day. The army could be supplied through the only port - Chhinnampo. It was known that it was mined, and the problem of opening it to shipping had to be resolved very quickly. However, the minesweepers were busy in Wonsan. In addition, Admiral Joy warned General Walker that if the situation in Chinnampo was the same as in Wonsan, it would take more than three weeks to clear it.

Three days before the full opening of Wonsan, Admiral Joy gave the order to begin trawling at Chhinnampo. To this, Admiral Smith reasonably remarked: “What to trawl with?” Not only did no one bother to organize the work: there was no necessary information, plans, maps, or people. The worst thing was something else: there were no minesweepers. At the admiral's request, two more mine experts flew to Korea: Commanders Clay and Archer. Clay was sent to Chhinnampo to obtain information, and Archer became responsible for trawling in that port. True, he had no ships at his disposal, but the admiral invited him to visit Sasebo and use everything he could find there.

Together with Commander DeForest, Archer settled in Sasebo harbor on Admiral Smith's flagship Dixie and, without further ado, announced a call for volunteers. As a result, a group was formed that included: the destroyer Forrest Royal, the minesweepers-destroyers Thompson and Karmik, the small minesweepers Pelican, Lastochka and Chaika, which arrived from Pearl Harbor, the Korean YMS -502, -306, -513 and -503", a helicopter with a pilot, as well as "LST Q-007", on the deck of which the said helicopter could land, and several other ships.

Trawling began on October 29 in the Yellow Sea, 39 miles west of the area where mines were suspected. On November 5, the Catamount joined the ships, becoming the first landing craft used in mine sweeping. Next to small minesweepers, she looked like a real giant, having a length of 458 feet and a displacement of 4,960 tons. Small “LCVPs” scurried through the gate opening at its stern, equipped with everything necessary to search for anchor and contact mines.

While Commander Archer was assembling the fleet, Commander Clay managed to find a Korean named Shorty, who was helping to install mines. Aviation got involved again. Naval pilots in Marches based at Gardiner's Bay began overflying the area on 28 October. A little later they were joined by the British Sunderlands. Over six weeks, the pilots noticed 340 mines, many of them destroyed by machine-gun fire.

Thanks to the caution and foresight of Commander Archer, not a single accident occurred during the operation. True, the work was boring, monotonous and unpleasant due to inclement and very cold weather. The engines on small boats had to take a long time to warm up after frosty nights. Every evening the helicopter crew drained the oil from the engine and took it into a warm room so that it would remain warm by morning.

Even more debilitating than the cold was the monotony. Days passed in an endless succession, no different from each other, the tides gave way to low tides, and the trawling continued. In the end, even topics for conversation dried up, and for lack of anything better, people began to discuss Herman. This name was given to one of the half-dozen bodies that were tossed to the shore by the tide and carried back out to sea. They became nameless victims of armed conflict, condemned to the icy purgatory of the Yellow Sea. The tide did not throw them ashore on which they once walked, but it also did not allow them to find peace in the dark depths of the sea. Herman, who during his lifetime was one of the millions of Asians, was now a dead body, and the one who made him so was not too lazy to first tie his hands behind his back. The body was well preserved in the icy water and was quite recognizable. He was given the name Herman, and he gave the minesweeper sailors some topic for conversation. Every morning people woke up, realized that they were alive and were in a position incomparably better than the corpse floating in the sea, after which they asked: “I wonder where Hermann is now?”

In the Chhinnampo harbor, the enemy laid 212 mines, blocking one of the approach channels. There could have been more of them, but planes from the British aircraft carrier Theseus sank a certain craft, suspecting it to be a barge with mines. The “Frogs” then found the sunken barge and found 15 minutes on board.

To check the quality of the trawling, Commander Clay sent a North Korean tug out to sea from the Chinnampo dock. Then the Korean “YMS-503” entered the port, followed by “LSU-1402” and other shallow-draft craft. Three days later, Clay took his first LST. On November 12, the canal was opened to large-tonnage ships, and the floating hospital Repose was the first to enter the port. By the end of November, trawling in Chhinnampo was completed. 80 mines were destroyed.

As a result of the operations in Wonsan and Chinnampo, the fleet was once again confronted with a fact that had been conveniently forgotten during five years of peace: for mine sweeping, it is not enough to have a few junior officers who would organize a show. For trawling to be effective, it must be carried out by specially trained people with the support of other types of ships and aircraft, as well as numerous special equipment. Of course, no one belittles the importance of anti-submarine ships and aircraft carriers, but we also cannot forget about the mine fleet.

The minesweepers had not yet finished their work in one place when they were urgently needed in another. Now they were waiting in Hungnam, where they planned to load troops onto ships. The same people who had happily left the overloaded ships at Wonsan a few weeks ago now looked forward to getting on board again.

Soon after landing in Wonsan, the Americans sent their troops along both sides of the Korean Peninsula, hoping for a quick victory over North Korea. But in early November the situation suddenly became more complicated - the Chinese launched an offensive from Manchuria. The war has begun again.

On the night of November 27, more than 100,000 Chinese communists attacked the 1st Marine Division in the Chosan area. For several days the Marines fought bravely, but on December 2 it became clear to everyone: the only way out was to withdraw to Hung Nam. The 8th and 10th armies also retreated.

The fleet was ready. The 90th operational formation of ships left for Korea on November 30. The loading of troops and equipment began on December 3 in Wonsan, on December 6 in Chhinnampo, and on December 7 in Incheon. In Hung Nam, the first transports received people on December 10. Two weeks later, on the eve of Christmas, the last ship left the harbor, filled with fire and the roar of guns.

Christmas Eve... At home at this time, elegant holly wreaths hung in the brightly lit windows, music was playing everywhere, people wished each other a Merry Christmas. And in Hung Nam the evacuation was ending: the last transport had left the pier, the destroyers were firing the remaining shells, and fires were roaring on the shore. The overloaded LSTs lined up behind each other like a line of toy elephants and headed south toward Busan, Korea's dirtiest and most congested port, bringing even more chaos. Over the past two weeks, 180 ships loaded 200 thousand people, 350 thousand tons of cargo, 17,500 units of wheeled vehicles. The enemy did not interfere with loading. Most likely, the Communists decided not to poke through the barrage wall created around Hung Nam by fire support ships that were keeping watch off the coast.

Regardless of which direction the transports with troops and equipment were going, if they had to move within the dangerous Korean waters, within the limits limited by the 100-fathom isobath, the best thing was to send several minesweepers ahead of them. These ships are always in action.

1951 The Korean War had already lasted six months. The North Korean army was defeated, but strong Chinese armies arrived there. They had enough time to mine the harbors and shallow coastal waters. Now the minesweepers worked in different conditions from last year. The urgent operations carried out in 1950 - Inchon, Wonsan, Hungnam - were completed, and time was no longer a fundamental factor. In addition, minesweeper crews, previously consisting mostly of green novices, have now gained experience and become veterans. In addition, there are more minesweepers themselves. An increase in repair capacity and a better supply of spare parts, if not improved the operating conditions of mine fleet ships, then at least made them less difficult.

The main purpose of trawling in 1951 was to ensure that American ships could get close enough to the shores of North Korea to conduct effective bombardment of the territory, aimed at destroying communications facilities, troop concentrations, firing points and warehouses. In addition, minesweepers, by their appearance, misled the enemy, forcing him to transfer troops to the minesweeping site in anticipation of the impending invasion. Minesweepers significantly increased the effectiveness of the American blockade and fire support ship operations in the Wonsan-Hungnam-Songning area by maintaining mine-free routes between ports. In addition, they reduced the threat from floating mines and often “guided” ships to targets, especially in the area of ​​​​the large railway junction of Hamhung.

During operations off the coast of Korea, many new, useful techniques appeared in the work of minesweepers. Here they were followed everywhere by a small, flat-bottomed LST-799, which became a floating platform for helicopters. Trawling began to be carried out at night too; Previously, only mines were set at night. This measure was necessary, since during the day fire from the shore often prevented ships from approaching. Now helicopters always flew in front of the minesweepers, which were mostly engaged in searching for mines, although often, in addition to their direct duties, they took part in all kinds of rescue operations. They warned minesweeper commanders about the appearance of mines, the direction and extent of minefields, the location of enemy coastal batteries, etc. In some cases, they managed to remove minesweepers that were trapped from the minefield unharmed.

Minesweepers carried out systematic cleaning of the eastern coast, as well as widening the channels leading to Kogo and Wonsan. In May, at the request of the British, they carried out urgent trawling in Chhinnampo. No mines were discovered in this operation. Thus, once again, proof of an obvious fact was obtained: it is absolutely not necessary to lay mines in order to provoke intensive trawling and cause panic in the enemy’s ranks. The threat is enough.

After completing trawling in Chinnam-po, minesweepers cleared the eastern coast of the peninsula from Suwan-Da to Wonsan. In three months they raised more than 200 mines. They then moved to the Hungnam area, which, according to rumors, was heavily mined. Despite constant fire from the shore, minesweepers picked up more mines in three months than during the entire period of the Korean War. At the beginning of November, the ships were already in Chongjin, only 75 miles from Vladivostok. Several dozen mines were raised there, and enough new ones to make sure that the enemy was continuing to mine water areas.

Mining in Korean was a primitive process, which did not reduce the lethal power of mines. The enemy worked at night, using small fishing sampans, junks and boats for this purpose. The small sampans could only take two mines at a time, which then had to be thrown into the water by hand. But even two mines took the minesweepers a lot of time.

At the beginning of 1953, the enemy began to use special anti-submarine mines. They were first spotted in Wonsan. No bigger than a regular ball, they contained a 44-pound charge of trinitrotoluene and exploded on contact. They were installed on the surface of the water in the areas of intended landing from the sea. The threat of such mines has necessitated additional searches in hazardous areas using underwater equipment and helicopters.

By the beginning of June 1953, the enemy began to use mines equipped with a self-installation mechanism, which made the use of even such primitive minelayers as sampans unnecessary. Such mines were hung under empty barrels, drums or logs on a special hook and released after a special washer was dissolved in water.

Although the threat from enemy mines increased in 1951–1952, only two American ships were damaged by mines after 1951. On August 18, Typhoon Karen swept along the coast, tearing off many mines. One of them was hit by Sarsi. Next month ships 7th Fleet sank more than 40 floating mines in the Sea of ​​Japan. True, one mine managed to travel 90 miles to Wonsan, where on September 16 it damaged the destroyer Barton. Shortly before the ship struck a mine, Commander Seim had finished reading an information message stating that a ship traveling at a speed of more than 10 knots was not in danger from floating mines, since the stem threw them along with the water to the sides. But the wave created by the Barton, traveling at a speed of 15 knots, failed to throw the mine to a safe distance.

Over the last two years of the war, the main concern for minesweepers was not mines, but enemy coastal guns. Small minesweepers, which had 3-inch guns on their decks, could not compete with the heavy 122-mm guns firing from the shore. The minesweepers-destroyers, which had more serious artillery weapons, often engaged in firefights, and not without success. But nevertheless, when the fire from the shore became too accurate, the most reasonable thing was to quickly leave, preferably under the protection of a dense smoke screen. It must be admitted that the communists turned out to be sharp shooters. At least 11 minesweepers were damaged, and the Osprey, Endicott and Thompson even set a kind of record, albeit a very dubious one, for the number of hits by enemy shells: three each.

For minesweepers working at night in the northern regions, fishing sampans were a big problem. It was no secret to anyone that the food supply in the country was very bad, many Koreans were starving, and they really needed fish. But sampans could be loaded with more than just fish. They often had mines on them. On May 7, the Ptarmigan sailors captured 5 sampans; three days later this record was broken by the Marreleta team, which chalked up six boats. In September, the Canadian destroyer Nootka sank a large junk from which North Korean officers were laying mines. She turned out to be the only enemy ship sunk by American ships that had been off the Korean coast for a long time.

On July 27, 1953, that is, after 37 months and two days of war, as well as more than two years of armistice discussions, the guns fell silent in Korea. The Americans lost 142 thousand people and almost 20 billion dollars in Korea.

The Korean War was over, but the US Navy, suddenly imbued with a respect for mines, was already building 150 new non-magnetic minesweepers - modern wooden ships on which "iron" men would sail. Both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets expanded their mine units. The mine school in Yorktown trained specialists, and at the mine control station in Panama City (Florida), experts were looking for new ways to combat this underwater evil. In general, the work continued.

Mines, minelayers and minesweepers may undergo significant changes in the future, but the goals of mine warfare have been and will remain the same - control of the sea. If we take one particular case, then the minesweeper, which worked in the Yellow Sea long after the end of the Korean War, could be replaced by helicopters. But the sea will continue to occupy most of the surface of the globe, and whoever wants to dominate it must be prepared to wage a mine war.

Future battles may take place in space altitudes at supersonic speeds, but ships will still sail the seas, and submarines will silently glide in the dark depths of the sea. No one should block our fleet’s path across the vast expanses of the sea. We should no longer be left without mine warfare capabilities, wherever and whenever they are needed.

From the book Notes about Mikhail Bulgakov author Yanovskaya Lidiya Markovna

SEVERAL DOCUMENTS FROM THE PAST TO THE USSR Prosecutor's Office I ask the USSR Prosecutor's Office to begin an investigation into the tragic shortages in the Mikhail Bulgakov fund (archive), located in the Manuscripts Department of the Lenin Library. Strange indifference

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CHAPTER TWO A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE LOCATION The airfield was hidden in the forest. Maples and birches closely surrounded the airfield, and when the gusts of wind generated by the airplane propellers reached them, they slowly dropped their leaves to the ground. The wind immediately died down in the foliage, the crowns of trees

From the book The Experience of Reviving Russian Villages author Tyurin Gleb Vladimirovich

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CHAPTER THREE WHAT FOREIGNERS SAW What an unbiased viewer talks about. From Tiflis to Fontainebleau. Basic principles. Man of the fourth dimension. Daily life in the Abbey, seen from the outside. The English publisher wants to get rid of any doubts.

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CHAPTER TEN A FEW WORDS OF FAREWELL, OR THE PARABLE OF THE MONKEY AND THE CALABASH Now all I can do is thank the reader who has overcome such a weighty book. I think he belongs to a special breed of people, to which I consider myself. Accordingly, I studied it well.

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From the book Dyatlov Pass: the mystery of the death of Sverdlovsk tourists in February 1959 and atomic espionage in the Soviet Urals author Rakitin Alexey Ivanovich

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A minesweeper is a special-purpose ship whose task is to search, detect and destroy sea mines and guide ships (vessels) through minefields.

By displacement, minesweepers are divided into sea (displacement 660-1300 tons), base (up to 600 tons), raid (up to 250 tons), river (up to 100 tons). According to the principle of operation, they are divided into minesweepers themselves and minesweepers-mine hunters.

Marine (squadron) minesweeper- a class of warships with a displacement from 600 to 1300 tons, designed for search, detection, trawling at sea depths from 25 to 150 meters and the destruction of sea anchor and bottom mines, as well as for guiding ships (vessels) through minefields in the near and far sea ​​zone. Minesweepers of this type were fast (for traveling together with the fleet or its individual formations), seaworthy (for working at sea during a storm) and having a large range (for trawling in areas remote from their home bases). They had acoustic and electromagnetic stealth. In addition, they could be used to lay active or defensive minefields. The main weapons of sea minesweepers were various types of trawls, search engines and miner swimmers. To protect against enemy ships and aircraft, as well as to destroy mines, minesweepers were equipped with artillery systems and depth charges.

Basic minesweeper- a class of warships with a displacement of up to 600 tons, designed for searching, trawling and destroying mines in bases, coastal areas and the near sea zone (50 miles), as well as guiding ships (vessels) through minefields and laying minefields. In addition, minesweepers were used to protect the water area and were divided into minesweepers themselves and minesweepers. Basic minesweepers were armed with various types of ship trawls, special search apparatus, cord charges and demagnetizing devices, and for protection - with guns and machine guns.

Raid minesweeper- a class of warships with a displacement of up to 250 tons, designed for searching, trawling and destroying sea mines in roadsteads and dispersed basing areas with bottom depths of up to 80 meters, as well as laying minefields in coastal zones. There were actually minesweepers and minesweepers. The weapons of raid minesweepers were various types of trawls, special search devices, cord charges and demagnetizing devices, and for protection - guns and machine guns.

River (boat) minesweeper- a warship with a displacement of up to 100 tons, designed to search and destroy small-deep mines on inland waterways (rivers, lakes, canals and reservoirs), as well as in roadsteads and harbors. It was equipped with boat (lightweight) trawls for use at shallow depths. The boat was armed with anti-aircraft heavy machine guns, small arms machine guns, depth charges or mines.

The main weapons of the minesweepers themselves were various types of trawls. Contact trawls are, as a rule, strong chains with a number of knives attached to them and a diverter-deeper at the end. With their help, mines were cut off and pop-up mines were shot. Acoustic trawls are designed to detonate mines with acoustic fuses, simulating the acoustic pattern of the passage of a large ship. Electromagnetic (solenoid) - similar to acoustic, simulated electromagnetic radiation from a target.

In accordance with this, requirements for acoustic and electromagnetic stealth were imposed on the minesweeper. To achieve this, the minesweeper hull was made of non-magnetic materials (wood, plastic), the dimensions and draft were limited, demagnetizing devices were installed, damping and sound insulation of mechanisms, and non-cavitating propellers were used. Preventative measures were also applied - periodically, or before trawling, the ship’s physical fields (primarily acoustic and magnetic) were measured and reduced. In addition, the minesweeper was used in modes that minimized induced fields, in particular low speeds, to reduce noise and dynamic pressure.

The emergence of minesweepers and mine hunters was caused by the improvement of mine fuses, which reduced the reliability of etching. Therefore, a logical development of combat trawling was proposed: not to use trawls, but to search for and destroy mines with demolition charges. The main weapons here were search engines or miner swimmers.

During the war, a number of British bomber aircraft were converted into minesweepers. German aircraft underwent similar modifications. To combat magnetic mines, they were equipped with large conductive rings and separate engines with generators to create a powerful magnetic field. The disadvantages of such systems, in addition to complicated piloting, were that with overly sensitive mine fuses, they could detonate directly under the aircraft, which was forced to fly above the very surface of the water. In addition, only mines at shallow depths could be destroyed this way.

Ships, both specially built and converted civilian and military vessels of other types, took part in the war. Thus, more than 1 thousand minesweepers were built in Great Britain on the basis of trawlers, drifters and whaling ships. Half of the minesweepers of the USSR consisted of converted trawlers, cargo and towing ships. During the war, minesweepers of various types of their own were used by 23 countries.

Approximate number of minesweepers used in the war by country and type (excluding captured and transferred/received)

Countries	Types of minesweepers/dead				Total
	Marine	Basic	Raid	River
1	2	3	4	5	6
Australia	54/3	—	—	—	54/3
Argentina	—	15	—	—	15
Bulgaria	—	—	—	17/1	17/1
Brazil	—	3	2	—	5
Great Britain	296/41	1033/219	436/40	—	1765/300
Germany	216/100	34/18	329/159	45/23	624/300
Greece	—	4/3	10	—	14/3
Denmark	—	6/2	—	10/1	16/3
Italy	—	2/1	37/21	3	42/22
Latvia	—	3/2	—	—	3/2
Lithuania	—	1/1	—	—	1/1
Netherlands	—	8/5	20/20	26/8	54/33
Norway	—	2	6	—	8
Poland	—	—	6/4	—	6/4
Romania	—	1/1	—	—	1/1
USSR	42/10	44/18	244/45	29/1	359/74
USA	284/33	476/20	72	—	832/53
Türkiye	—	3	—	2	5
Finland	—	7	4/2	25/2	36/4
France	—	—	86/56	—	86/56
Sweden	—	14	5/1	24	43/1
Estonia	—	—	—	1/1	1/1
Japan	37/31	—	22/11	—	59/42
TOTAL	929/218	1656/290	1279/359	182/37	4046/904

In addition to the above data, the United States transferred 22 sea and 152 road minesweepers to Great Britain, 7 base and 5 road minesweepers to Greece, 1 sea minesweeper to Spain, 34 sea and 43 road minesweepers to the USSR, 31 to France, and 4 road minesweepers to Norway. The UK transferred 9 minesweepers to Belgium, 7 base and 5 raid minesweepers to Greece, 12 minesweepers to the USSR, 14 to France. Germany transferred 4 raid minesweepers to Romania. In addition to minesweepers, 114 obstacle breakers served in Germany. Germany used 41 captured minesweepers, Italy - 11, USSR - 13, Japan - 12.

The enemy. We will talk about it in the article.

Some terminology

According to their operating principle, minesweepers are divided into sea, base, raid and river. Trawls are also divided into acoustic, contact and electromagnetic. Acoustic ones are designed to detonate acoustic mines, simulating the sound of a ship passing. Contact trawls are the simplest in design and consist of a chain with knives that cut off the mine-holding cables, after which the floating charge is destroyed from the side of the minesweeper using machine guns or small-caliber artillery. Electromagnetic ones create an electric field that simulates a passing ship, and are used against magnetic mines. In the photos of minesweepers you can also see installations of depth charges, with the help of which the minesweeper can perform the functions of a submarine hunter.

The birth of minesweepers

With the advent of a new type of weapon - sea mines - in the arsenals of the fleets of the largest maritime powers, the question arose of searching for and neutralizing them. Mines have become the main means of defending naval bases and disrupting enemy sea communications. The age-old “shield-sword” question was successfully resolved for the first time in the Russian Navy. Mine sweepers received their baptism of fire in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War. The combat experience of Russian minesweepers was thoroughly studied in other countries, which resulted in a sharp increase in the number of minesweepers in active fleets during the interwar period.

The Second World War

The Second World War gave a sharp impetus to all types of weapons, including warships. Mine sweepers became better protected and armed, and could perform other tasks:

• landing troops;
• shell the coast;
• escort transport convoys;
• evacuate troops.

The most advanced were the German minesweepers, whose crews received the “Mine Sweeper” badge for their courage. After the end of World War II, the old minesweepers were engaged in demining the seas for a long time, giving up their combat post to new ships that used advanced shipbuilding experience.

Modernity

The basic concept of a modern minesweeper was formulated in Great Britain in the 1960s. The ship, equipped with a powerful acoustic radar, searched for mines, and if they were found, it released an uninhabited underwater vehicle that was engaged in further search and examination of the discovered object. He destroys mines with an anti-mine device: bottom mines by applying a demolition charge, contact mines by cutting the anchor cable. This one received the name minesweeper-mine detector (TSCHIM) in the world fleets.

Since the 1970s and 1980s, almost all the world's minesweepers have been SCALE, either newly built or converted from old minesweepers. Trawls now serve a secondary function. With the widespread use of broadband mines installed at the very bottom, with an impressive target detection range and a torpedo or missile warhead, a modern minesweeper needs to have a deep-sea trawl to work at a short distance from the ground.

With the growth of the characteristics of commercial hydroacoustic stations, especially side-scan locators, it became possible to use them to search and destroy mines, which dramatically increased the productivity of mine action forces. In ports and areas, near naval bases, advance inspection began to be carried out, as a result of which all objects resembling mines are entered into a catalogue. This makes it possible in wartime to immediately identify new objects, which, in the overwhelming majority, will be mines. All this increases the effectiveness of mine action forces and ensures safe exit from ports and bases.

The development of mine countermeasures, which began in the West in the 1960s, led to an increase in the effectiveness of these forces. It is also noteworthy that the fight against mines is increasingly moving away from “highly specialized” actions, becoming a whole complex of activities, involving various forces and means.

During Operation Shock and Awe (the US and allied military invasion of Iraq in 2003), Iraqi minelayers disguised as merchant ships were captured by Allied Special Operations Forces, more than 100 Iraqi mines were discovered and destroyed by divers and uninhabited submarines devices. As a result of these actions, the Allies suffered no casualties from Iraqi mines, allowing American ground forces to achieve complete success.

Modular mine action systems

Recently, the rapid development of mine countermeasures forces has resulted in the use of modular mine countermeasures systems (MAS). Equipped with these systems, warships and submarines can now independently combat mines without the need for minesweepers. The most interesting MPS is the uninhabited underwater vehicle RMS AN/WLD-1. A semi-submersible, remotely controlled vehicle with a towed side-scan locator is capable of independently searching for mines for quite a long time at a great distance from the carrier ship. The US Navy currently has 47 such devices.

The first domestic post-war basic minesweepers of projects 254 and 264 were significantly inferior in terms of their physical fields to their foreign-built counterparts. Therefore, in the 50s, the Navy carried out intensive research and development work in the field of protecting minesweepers from mine explosions in three main directions:
- early detection of a mine ahead of the minesweeper in order to avoid meeting it;
- reducing the level of physical fields of ships to a safe level;
- increasing the explosion resistance of ships.
As it turned out, sufficiently reliable detection of anchor mines ahead of the course is possible with the help of high-frequency hydroacoustic stations (GAS) for mine detection, while their use significantly increases the productivity of mine reconnaissance. The first domestic GAS “Olen” (MG - 59) was tested on the base minesweeper of Project 264 and was put into service in 1959. GAS MG - 59 had excessively large dimensions, its use on serial ships of projects 254 and 264 was abandoned, but on its basis the GAS Lan (MG - 69) was created, providing, as tests have shown, , reliable detection of anchor mines at distances of 1000 - 1100 m.
Work to reduce the physical fields of minesweepers has been carried out since the early 50s. In 1958, the USSR Government issued a Decree “On increasing the protection and secrecy of Navy ships from underwater non-contact weapons” and means of detecting the enemy.” In accordance with this Decree, the development of measures was envisaged to reduce the physical fields of minesweepers and requirements for their permissible levels, recording and analysis equipment fields, as well as the creation of special training grounds and stands. By the end of the 50s, the following were built: a special testing ground for measuring physical fields, a testing ground for mine weapons, two non-winding demagnetization stations (SBR), three control and measuring magnetic stations (KIMS) and eight hydroacoustic control vessels (GKS). In particular, KIMS-2 (Amur Bay, 2nd River), KIMES-315 (Russky Island, Novik Bay) were built at the Pacific Fleet.
It was proposed to increase the explosion resistance of minesweepers by strengthening the hull, shock-absorbing protection and using shock-resistant equipment.

Based on the above-mentioned design and development work, in 1956 the Navy issued tactical and technical specifications to TsKB-363 (later Western Design Bureau (PKB), post office box A-1277) for the development of a project for a new generation ship of the base minesweeper of Project 266, ship 3 rank. Chief designer of the project N.P. Pegov, chief observer from the Navy, captain 2nd rank V.T. Kuzmin. The development of the preliminary design was completed in 1957, the technical design in 1958. The technical design was approved in 1959.
The Project 266 BTS was designed to be highly specialized, with new anti-mine weapons, non-magnetic (low-magnetic) and partially noise-free equipment (including high-speed star-shaped main engines of the M503B type), with low-noise controlled pitch propellers (CPR), night vision equipment and underwater communications, hydroacoustic station detection of anchor mines, the antenna of which was located in the fairing of the lifting and lowering device (LOD). The ship's preliminary design was developed in two versions: with a hull made of low-magnetic steel, covered on the outside (according to the original plan) with a 20-mm rubber coating, and with a wooden hull. Already at the initial design stage, the wooden case had to be abandoned due to the lack of the necessary production base in the country, and the project was developed in a case made of low-magnetic steel Yu3.
In terms of architectural type, the BTSh pr. 266 resembled the similar BTSh pr. 264A, but had a smaller (by 320 tons) displacement and a relative elongation (ratio of length to width) of 5.5 instead of 7.4, as a result of which the ship had a more powerful energy installation (larger by 1000 hp) had a lower speed. One rudder (one rudder blade) was installed. To reduce the level of physical fields, numerous measures and devices were provided that had not previously been used in the fleet. To reduce the level of the magnetic field and to protect against proximity mines with magnetic circuit channels, the hull and hull structures were made of low-magnetic steel Yu3, the first in domestic shipbuilding. Doors, hatches and their coamings, ladders, railings, numerous fenders, etc. were made of light aluminum-magnesium alloys (AMG). Mechanisms, weapons, devices and equipment were manufactured in a low-magnetic design. The demagnetizing device (DE) with an automatic control system contained both general ship windings (main horizontal - OSHT, course buttock - KB, course frame - KSh), and local windings for the main largest mechanisms (OSHT, KB, KSh on the main engines, diesel generators and auxiliary boiler unit, capstan electric motor). In addition, an eddy demagnetization device (EDD) with an automatic control system was provided to compensate for the magnetic fields of eddy currents arising in the ship's hull during rolling, with the main vortex winding - OV, buttock eddy windings - BV. To reduce the acoustic field of the ship, the following were used: sound insulation with the help of shock absorbers, pasting with a vibration-damping rubber coating on the foundations of the main mechanisms (GDGD, DGDG, compressor) and engine room bulkheads, soundproofing flexible inserts in pipelines, systems and places of connection to mechanisms (in particular, shafting to main engine power take-off flange), the use of low-noise, large-diameter variable-pitch propellers with a relatively high rotation speed. For the first time in domestic practice, special measures were envisaged to reduce low-frequency electromagnetic (exclusion of sacrificial protection, etc.) and electrical (dielectric coatings of equipment in contact with sea water, electrical insulation of sea-bottom fittings, shaft lines from the hull, etc.) fields. The sweeping and deck mechanisms (winch, view, beam cranes) were transferred to hydraulic drives, which, along with ensuring a decrease in the level of the ship’s physical fields, made it possible to obtain mechanisms with a large range of smooth speed control. Oil was supplied to the hydraulic system of the deck mechanisms from three pumping units, consisting of IID20 pumps with their own electric drives. The steering gear is also switched to a hydraulic drive with the Albatross control system, which provides simple, servo and automatic control modes. One rudder blade was installed.
The main power plant is two-shaft with an echelon arrangement (in two engine rooms) of the main engines of the M503B type with a power of 2,500 hp each. The main engines drove BP 266 adjustable pitch propellers. The propeller pitch was changed by a hydraulic system, the oil supply to which was carried out by electrically driven pumps. Provision was made for remote control of the main thruster and the control propeller from the engine control posts and from the main gearbox. The electric power plant included three diesel generators (~ 380V, 50 Hz) with a total power of 500 kW (2x200 kW with 7D12 diesel engines, 1x100 kW with 7D6 diesel engine).

The ship's unsinkability was ensured by dividing it into 9 waterproof compartments.

1 compartment with (-) 5 - 5 frames - forepeak, chain box, paint store;
2 compartment with 5 - 13 frames - spire, artillery ammunition cellar, spare parts storeroom, bilge compartment;
3 compartment with 13 - 22 frames - corridor No. 1, officer's cabins, latrine, officer's shower room, aggregate medicinal station, dry provisions storeroom, refrigerator truck room and refrigeration chamber;
4th compartment with 22 - 36 frames - corridor No. 2, bow cockpit, officer's cabins, wardroom, foremen's cabins, fender shaft, hydroacoustic compartment, gyropost;
5th compartment with frames 36 - 51 - personnel canteen, dishwasher, bow engine room;
6th compartment with 51 - 66 frames - corridor No. 3, energy and survivability station, galley, aft engine room, personnel locker room, latrine, washbasin, personnel shower
7 compartment with frames 66 - 78 - view room, aft cockpit, control propeller compartment;
8th compartment with frames 78 - 85 - minesweeper storeroom, mine-sweeping ammunition enclosure, wet provisions storeroom, hydraulic unit room;
9 compartment with 85 - 100 frames - tiller compartment.

Main design tactical and technical elements:

Displacement: standard - 520 tons, full - 560 tons.

Main dimensions: maximum length - 52.1 m, maximum width - 9.4 m, average draft
with full displacement - 2.65 m.

Type and power of the power plant: two-shaft, diesel, 2 x M503B main engines, 2,500 hp. each, nominal

main engine rotation speed - 1780 rpm, shafting - 320 rpm, propellers
adjustable pitch VR-266.

Electric power 2xDG (7D12), 200 kW, 1xDG (7D6), 100 kW, total power 500 kW.
To ensure the operation of the electromagnetic trawl, a special diesel
generator (diesel M826) with DC generator (500 kW).

Speed: full freewheel - 16 knots; with one trawl - 14 knots;
combat economic - 12 knots.

Cruising range: 1,500 miles at a speed of 12 knots.

Seaworthiness: unlimited.

Reserves: fuel - 92 tons;
motor oil - 2.7 tons;
drinking water - 16 tons;
boiler water - 5 tons;

Autonomy: 7 days;

Armament

Shturmanskoye: Gyrocompass “Girya?”, magnetic compasses “UKP - M1” and “UKP - M3”, log
MGL -?, echo sounder NEL - ?, radio direction finder ARP - 50R.

Artillery: 2x2 30mm twin automated artillery mounts
AK-230 with remote control from the MP-104 system and sighting devices

columns

Anti-mine: contact trawl BKT, electromagnetic trawl TEM-2, acoustic trawl AT-3.

Communications: Shortwave transmitter R-657, receiver R-657K, VHF station R-619,

ZAS equipment, all-wave receiver "Volna-2K", GGS P-400 "Kashtan"

Radio engineering: navigation radar “Don”, radar SU MR-104 “Lynx”, system equipment

identification system "Nichrome", infrared night vision equipment "Khmel",

electro-optical night vision equipment ME5 (“Trombone”);

Hydroacoustic: sonar MG-69 "Lan".

Chemical weapons: VPKhR chemical reconnaissance device
radiation monitoring devices DP-62.
for emergency batches gas masks IP-46
chemical kits KZI-2
backpack decontamination devices
SF-4 powder - 6 kg
filter gas masks for l/s - 110%
smoke bombs DShM-60 - 4 pcs.

Crew: 56 people (including 6 officers).

The guideline service life of Project 266 ships is 20 years.

The ship's time between repairs (current / average) is 3.5 years / 7.5 years;
The interdocking period is 1.5 years.

The minesweeper of Project 266 received further development in Project 266M “Aquamarine”. It should be mentioned that in the 60s, the development of the Project 1251 minesweeper, which was a fiberglass modification of Project 266, was carried out. The design was led by the Western Central Design Bureau. Chief designer D.T. Pohodun. The technical design was developed, but the construction of the ships of the project was forced to be abandoned due to the unavailability of the production base at that time.

The construction of the Project 266 main building was launched at the Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard (Leningrad, Pontonny settlement) and the Khabarovsk Shipyard named after S.M. Kirov (PO Box A - 3126) of the USSR Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. The introduction of a large number of new technical solutions into the project complicated and delayed the construction and delivery of the lead ships to the Navy. Thus, during construction, it became clear that the rubber coating of the outer hull plating was insufficiently durable, the failure of which led to an unforeseen increase in draft and other negative consequences, which required prompt adjustments to the project during the construction of the ships. Many difficulties arose when processing hull structures made of low-magnetic steel Yu3, which was first used in domestic shipbuilding, and their subsequent welding. This steel had a tendency to crack as a result of stresses arising during processing. The correction of residual deformations that appear during the processing of structures made of this steel by conventional heating and subsequent mechanical action turned out to be unacceptable, since cracks formed and it was necessary to replace, for example, a whole sheet or part of a sheet according to the size of the residual deformation. Looking ahead, it should be noted that during the period of operation of the first ships in the construction of the series, a large number of cracks occurred in the hull structures during their processing (grinding, straightening). Over time, ways have been found to combat the tendency of low-magnetic steel to crack. Thus, in order to remove residual stresses that arise during the processing of structures made of this steel, and to surface harden the body and its structures, they began to process the body and its structures using the shot blasting method, using lead shot, and using beam pneumatic hammers. This was done during the construction of the ship. It should have been carried out during the period of factory repairs, which, unfortunately, was not done, and therefore, after 10-15 years of operation, problems arose with the formation of cracks, especially in the second day, which led to fuel watering, and as a result, a decrease in fuel reserve and autonomy in terms of fuel reserves (fuel was simply not accepted into these tanks).
The lead ship of the BT-86 project took 4 years to build and was delivered to the Navy by the Khabarovsk Shipyard in 1963. Subsequently, the construction period of the project ships (from laying down to delivery to the fleet) took less than 2 years (18-20 months) . During the tests of the lead ship, its fundamental difference from all minesweepers previously built in the country was fully revealed, namely its high degree of its own protection against mine explosions. The level of the magnetic field of the ships of Project 266 was reduced compared to the ships of Project 254 and 264 by almost 40 times, the electric field by 10-15 times, the acoustic field in a wide frequency range by 3-4 times, the hydrodynamic field by 20-30% . However, changes in the ratios of the main dimensions and contours of the ship led to a slight deterioration in the seaworthiness and habitability conditions of the ship compared to its predecessors, ships of Projects 254 and 264.
In 1963 - 1971 According to project 266, 41 units of ships and 4 units of ships in export modification were built at the Sredne-Nevsky and Khabarovsk shipyards (project 266E, chief designer N.P. Pegov). At the same time, 16 ships were built at the Khabarovsk Shipyard, 39% of the entire series (serial numbers S-50 - S-65), which were included in the Pacific Fleet. It should be noted that the Khabarovsk Shipyard together with the Vladivostok Shipyard, starting from the 60s, fully implemented the military shipbuilding program in terms of supplying rank 3 - 4 ships to the Pacific Fleet (skr project 159 and its modifications, MRK project 1234 , MPK project 201, 204, 1124, mtsh project 266, 266M, btsh project 257 and its modifications, 1265, fabric project 206, 206M, rka pr. 183, 205 and its modifications, 1241.1, 12411, border skr project 205P, 12 412 , 12410, etc.). During this period, the Khabarovsk Shipyard worked more than intensively, delivering almost 2 units to the fleet annually. btsch pr. 266, 1-2 units. skr pr. 159, 1-2 units. MPK pr. 204. Subsequently, a number of Project 266 ships were transferred to the navies of foreign states, in particular the Vietnamese Navy. In 1966, by order of the Navy Civil Code, a new classification of ship personnel was introduced, according to which mine-resistant ships with a displacement of over 500 tons were classified as sea minesweepers, those with a displacement of 150 - 500 tons were classified as base minesweepers, and those with a displacement of less than 150 tons were classified as raid minesweepers. Accordingly, Project 266 ships were transferred to the class of sea minesweepers. The Pacific Fleet included the following BTSH (mTSH) of the project:

"MT - 86", serial number S - 50 (commissioned year 1963),

"MT - 53", serial number S - 51 (1964),

"MT - 58", serial number S - 52 (1965),

"MT - 27", serial number S - 53 (1966),

"MT - 80", serial number S - 54 (1966),

"MT - 82", serial number S - 55 (1966),

"MT - 238", serial number S - 56 (1967),

"MT - 242", serial number S - 57 (1967),

"MT - 193", serial number S - 58 (1968),

"MT - 200", serial number S - 59 (1968),

"MT - 208", serial number S - 60 (1969),

"MT - 221", serial number S - 61 (1970),

"MT - 257" (since 1981 MT "Vice Admiral Sabaneev"), serial number S - 62 (1969),

"MT - 263", serial number S - 63 (1969),

MT "Midshipman Pavlov", serial number S - 64 (1971),

MT - "Mina", serial number S - 65 (1972).

After construction, the ships were enlisted mainly in the 47 brkovr (Russky Island, Paris bay), several units in the 114 brkovr (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Zavoiko bay). At that time, a somewhat paradoxical situation arose. The ships of the project, immediately after construction and acceptance into the fleet, were put into reserve and mothballed, when it seemed that the place was for completely new ships, with much lower levels of physical fields and more advanced types of mine-sweeping weapons compared to minesweepers of the projects 254, 264, in constant readiness forces. So 9 units of the project (MT - 193, - 200, - 208, - 238, - 263, - 221, - 257, "Mina", "Midshipman Pavlov", this is, in fact, more than half of the entire series of ships of the construction project Khabarovsk Shipyard) immediately after construction were mothballed and included in the 71 dnkrez 47 brkovr and delivered to the b. Zhitkova (Russky Island). This was due to the fact that by that time the Pacific Fleet already had numerous minesweepers consisting of Project 254, 264 minesweepers, and the fleet staff did not allow the recruitment of new crews. Later, already in the 70-80s, as Project 254 minesweepers were excluded from the fleet, Project 264 minesweepers were transferred to the class of patrol ships, Project 266 minesweepers were withdrawn from the reserve, reactivated and transferred to the 142 bottoms 114 brkovr, 13 dntsch 33 brkovr (Sakhalin Island, Korsakov village), 38 dntsch 196 brkovr (Sovetskaya Gavan). At the same time, the MT "Mina" and "MT - 221" were taken out of storage and transferred to the Vietnamese Navy in 1979 and 1981, respectively. "MT - 257" ("Vice Admiral Sabaneev" was also taken out of mothballing and included in the 186 dntsch 7 brtsch PrFlRS based in Abrek Bay, Strelok Bay. Subsequently, the ship was transferred to the 142 dntsch 114 brtsh KamFlRS ( Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Zavoiko bay).As the construction of Project 266M minesweepers began and they were assigned to the 47th brigade, some of the Project 266 minesweepers from this formation were put into reserve and mothballed (MT - 53, - 86)
As their service progressed, the ships were transferred from one formation to another. So MT - 27 out of 47 Brkovr in 1967 were transferred to the 142 dntsch 114 brkovr, MT - 193, - 238 out of 114 brkovr (Kamchatka) in 1978 were transferred to the 212 dntsch of the newly formed 137 brkovr (Sovgavan naval base, Kuril Islands, Simushir Island, Broughton Bay). As part of 142 dntsch 114 brkovr KamFlRS there were MT - 27, - 58, - 80, - 82, - 208, as part of 13 dntsch 33 brkovr SakhFlRS MT - 200, "Michman Pavlov" (removed from the reserve, reactivated and transferred to Sakhalin in 1977), as part of 38 DNTSH 196 BRKR MT-242 (removed from the reserve, mothballed and transferred to the 82 BRKRZ in 1986), MT-263 (removed from the reserve, reactivated and transferred to the 38 DNTSh in 1986 .).

During their service, Project 266 missile ships of the Pacific Fleet were involved in combat service in the Indian Ocean, South China Sea and Korea Strait. In 1974, as part of the Pacific Fleet trawling detachment, which carried out contact and non-contact trawling of minefields in the Gubai and Inner Channel straits of the Gulf of Suez (Red Sea) after the Arab-Israeli war, they performed the tasks of mtsh pr. 266 of the Pacific Fleet MT "Michman Pavlov", - 193 jointly with MTSH of project 254K MT - 66, - 104, BTSH of project 257DM BT - 103, - 284. The tasks were completed successfully.

MT-86 by order of the Navy Civil Code dated 06/20/1986 No. 0114 was excluded from the combat personnel of the Pacific Fleet in 1987, MT-27, MT-53, MT-238 - by order of the Navy Civil Code dated 05/04/1989 No. 099 - in 1989, MT-58 - by order of the Navy Civil Code dated 04/19/1990 No. 069 - in 1990, MT-80, MT-193 - by order of the Navy Civil Code dated 06/24/1991 - in 1991, MT- 82, MT-200, MT "Michman Pavlov" -by order of the Civil Code of the Navy dated 07/03/1992- in 1992, MT-242, MT-263, MT-257 ("Vice Admiral Sabaneev") - by order of the Navy Civil Code dated June 30, 1993 No. 055 - in 1993,MT-208 - by order of the Navy Civil Code dated November 17, 1994 No. 086 - in 1994

All ships of the project were excluded from the fleet's operational composition after the expiration of the design service life (20 years). The ships served in the fleet from 21 years (MT "Michman Pavlov") to 26 years (MT-82, MT-242)

Designation:
BTSH - basic minesweeper
mtsch - sea minesweeper
MPK - small anti-submarine ship
rtsch - raid minesweeper
dntsch - minesweeper division
DNMPK - division of small anti-submarine ships
brtsch - minesweeper brigade
brkovr - brigade of water area protection ships
brkrez - brigade of reserve ships

Literature: - Abdulov K.B., magazine “Marine Collection”, No. 5, 1995, pp. 56-64, article “Marine
minesweepers of the Western Design Bureau";
- Burov V.N., “Domestic shipbuilding in the 3rd century of its history”, 1995,

St. Petersburg, "Shipbuilding";
- Kuzin V.P., Nikolsky V.I., “USSR Navy 1945-1991”, 1996, St. Petersburg,
Historical Maritime Society;
- “History of domestic shipbuilding”, volume 5 “Shipbuilding in the post-war

period 1946-1991", 1996, St. Petersburg, "Shipbuilding"

The selection of material was carried out by Captain 1st Rank Reserve Yangaev M.Sh.

added and made corrections:

Captain 2nd rank reserve Kamardin A.I.

Art. 1 Art. reserve Kutenkov S.